This paper presents the results of a novel approach for conducting a laboratory user study of secure email. All prior laboratory studies involve a single novice user that communicates with an expert study coordinator to complete study tasks. In our study, we recruit a pair of novice users to come in together and attempt to exchange secure email messages. The users are instructed to send information securely, pointed at a tool to use, and given no special training or instructions other than what the tool provides. This approach more accurately simulates the grassroots adoption that is necessary for secure email to spread. We present both quantitative and qualitative results of these pairs of novice users as they experience three kinds of secure email systems: integrated (Pwm), depot (Tutanota), and an integrated-depot hybrid (Virtru).
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen an increase in the promotion of secure email, with tools such as Tutanota [21] , Virtru [22] , ProtonMail [13] , StartMail [19] , Hushmail [11] and others being pitched for everyday use by novice users. This interest is likely spurred by concern over government surveillance of email, particularly when third-party services such as Gmail and Hotmail store email on their servers in the clear. The Electronic Frontier Foundation has heavily promoted secure communication, releasing a security scorecard of secure messaging systems, including several email tools [7] .
It is unclear whether these efforts to encourage novice users to switch to secure email will succeed, given that usable, secure email is still an open problem more than fifteen years after it was first formally studied [23] . Subsequent usability studies show that systems can be made more usable through automatic key management [10, 14, 1] , but even knowing this, there has yet to be a secure email system which has been widely deployed.
All prior laboratory usability studies of secure email bring one novice user at a time into the lab and have them communicate with a study coordinator as they use a secure email system. While this helps researchers understand how well a novice user can start using secure email when paired with an expert user (i.e., study coordinator), it leaves open the question of whether secure email could be adopted in a more grassroots fashion, where both parties of a secure email conversation are novice users.
In this work, we conduct the first two-person study of secure email where two novice users are brought into the lab together and asked to exchange secure email between themselves. We asked participants to bring a friend with them to the study, ensuring the participants already knew each other, in the hope that participants would behave more naturally. Participants then used several secure email variants, without any specific training or instructions on how to use the systems other than what the systems themselves provided.
Based on our experiences, this novel approach had several benefits. First, by having participants play different roles, we were able to gather data about different types of first use cases (i.e., sending a secure email first vs receiving a secure email first). Second, participants indicated that these studies were "more fun," and that they would have felt more pressure and discomfort from being "under the microscope" if they had been sending email to a study coordinator.
In our study, we test three different secure email systems: Pwm, Tutanota, and Virtru. Each of these systems represents a different philosophy related to the integration of secure email with existing email systems. Pwm integrates secure email with users existing Gmail accounts, allowing them to compose and receive secure email in an interface with which they are already comfortable. In contrast, Tutanota is a traditional secure email depot that requires users to log into Tutanota's website to interact with their secure messages. Virtru, is a hybrid of these two approaches, allowing users who install the Virtru plugin to use secure email that is integrated with Gmail, but also allowing non-Virtru users to receive en-crypted email through a depot-based system on Virtru's website.
Our results and participant comments shed light on several facets of secure email:
1. Hiding the details of how a secure messaging system provides security can lead to a lack of trust. This phenomenon was first noted by Ruoti et al. [14] , but their results are called into question by multiple confounding factors [1] . This work provides further evidence that when security is hidden from users, users are less likely to trust the system. For example, although Pwm and Virtru utilize the same authentication method, Pwm completes authentication without user interaction, causing several users to doubt Pwm's security. Similarly, participants like that Tutanota requires an email be encrypted with a password since this makes it clear that the message was protected, unlike other systems that manage and use keys behind the scenes.
2. Participants prefer integrated solutions to depot-based solutions. While to some it may be intuitive that the participants would prefer to continue using their existing email accounts, there are still numerous new depot-based systems that have recently received notice (e.g., Tutanota, ProtonMail, StartMail). Our results demonstrate that most everyday users strongly dislike using separate web sites (e.g., secure email depots) to read their email.
3. Tutorials are very important for secure email. When asked what they most liked about Pwm and Virtru, participants often reported that it was the tutorials presented alongside these systems. The efficacy of these tutorials is shown by the fact that using Pwm and Virtru, participants were able to quickly complete the study task, whereas using Tutanota, which lacks a tutorial, participants took on average 72% longer to complete the study tasks, often making mistakes as they did so.
4.
Participants want the ability to use secure email, but are unsure of when they would use it. Three-quarters of the participants in our study indicated that they wanted to be able to encrypt their email, but only one-quarter indicated that they would want to do so frequently. Furthermore, when asked to describe how they would use encrypted email in practice, most participants were unsure, only giving vague references to how secure email might be useful. This demonstrates a need for future research to establish whether the true problem facing secure email's adoption is usability, or whether in reality it is that day-today users have no regular need to send sensitive data via email.
RELATED WORK
Whitten and Tygar [23] conducted the first formal user study of a secure email system (i.e., PGP 5), uncovering serious usability issues with key management and users' understanding of the underlying public key cryptography. It was found that a majority of users were unable to successfully send encrypted email in the context of a hypothetical political campaign scenario. The results of the study took the security community by surprise and helped shape modern usable security research.
Replications of the Whitten and Tygar study were done by both Garfinkel and Miller [10] , and Sheng et al. [17] . Garfinkel and Miller showed that automatic key management was more usable than the manual key management present in the original experiment. However, the study revealed that the tool "was a little too transparent" regarding its integration with Outlook Express. As a result, some users failed to read the instructions associated with visual indicators. Sheng at al. demonstrated that despite improvements made to PGP in the seven years since Whitten and Tygar's original publication, key management was still a challenge for users. Furthermore, they showed that in the new version of PGP, encryption and decryption had become so transparent that users were unsure if a message they received had actually been encrypted.
More recently, Ruoti et al. [14] conducted a series of user studies with Private WebMail (Pwm), a secure email prototype that tightly integrates with the Gmail web interface.
Even though results showed the system to be quite usable, the authors found that some users made mistakes and were hesitant to trust the system due to the transparency of its automatic encryption. Ruoti et al. later revised Pwm to address some of the issues they uncovered, and we have included this improved version in our study.
In a replication of Ruoti et al.'s work, Atwater et al. verified that participants responded positively to automatic key management. Atwater et al. created a mock-up of Mailvelope wherein a user's key pair is generated automatically upon installation. Additionally, the user's public key is automatically shared with a public key server, and during email composition recipients' public keys are automatically retrieved from the key server as needed. Unfortunately it was not possible to include Atwater et al.'s mock-up in our study, as we discovered that it relied on hard-coded keys for email recipients, and the work required to implement a working key management system into their mock-up would have exceeded our resources. Furthermore, the mock-up did not simulate the delay that happens in practice when a sender has to wait for the recipient to generate and publish their public key. This made the mock-up incompatible with our study of first-times users and calls into question whether their results regarding the high usability of automated-PGP apply to the common scenario of first-time PGP users.
SECURE EMAIL
Two and a half decades after the invention of PGP, secure email still remains sparsely used. While some businesses require the use of secure email by their employees, there is little use of secure email by the population at large. While it is possible that secure email will eventually diffuse from the workplace, it may be more likely that if secure email is to flourish it will do so because of grassroots adoption; i.e., participants are able to discover secure email on their own and easily begin using it with their friends, family, and acquaintances.
To date, no secure email studies have tested the ability of two novice users to begin using secure email; instead, these stud-ies have tested a novice user interacting with an expert user (i.e., study coordinator). Both Whitten and Tygar's study [23] as well as Garfinkel While these studies are helpful in understanding the usability of secure email systems, it is unclear whether they can generalize to the case of grassroots adoption. Our study is unique in that it is the first study to test whether two participants, who knew each other before the study, would successfully be able to use secure email in a grassroots fashion. Our observations, as discussed later in this paper, show that this approach produces more natural behavior and was able to give a more complete picture of how users perform when they are introduced to secure email in different manners (i.e., installing then sending an email vs. receiving an email and then installing).
As previous studies have demonstrated, users are highly amenable to automatic key management. We selected three different types of secure email systems that are based on automatic key management. For each of these types of secure email systems we selected a representative system to include in our analysis: Pwm, Tutanota, Virtru. All three systems have a different level of integration into users' existing email systems. The remainder of this section describes the types of secure email that were tested and their respective systems.
Integrated Secure Email (Pwm)
Integrated secure email refers to secure email systems that integrate with users' existing email systems. In this model, users do not need to create new accounts, and are able to encrypt messages within the email interfaces they are already accustomed to [14] .
Private WebMail (Pwm) 1 is the representative system for this type of secure email. Pwm was developed as part of the research of Ruoti et al. [14] , and has the highest usability 2 of any secure email system tested in the literature. Similarly, because Pwm has been studied before, it provides a good baseline for comparing the results of the other systems tested in this study.
Pwm is a browser extension that tightly integrates with Gmail's web interface to provide secure email. Users are never exposed to any cryptographic operation, including the verification of the user's identity, which is completed without user interaction. Pwm modifies the color scheme of Gmail for encrypted emails in order to help users identify which messages have been encrypted. Pwm also includes inline tutorials that instruct users on how to operate Pwm as they are using it.
Depot-based Secure Email (Tutanota) Depot-based secure email refers to secure email systems that are separate from users' existing email systems. In depotbased secure email, users have a separate account with a secure email-depot, where they can send and receive secure emails. When a user receives a new message in their depot account, many depot-based systems will send an email to the user's standard email address, informing them that they have a new email to check in the depot system. Often, depot-based secure email systems do not allow users to send email to individuals not already using the depot. Depot-based systems are commonly deployed by companies and organizations for secure communication.
While there are many depot-based systems to choose from, most are either costly (e.g., Hushmail, StartMail) or are currently not offering email addresses to new users (e.g., ProtonMail). We selected Tutanota 3 as the representative system for depot-based secure email because it is free, currently available to new users, being discussed on Twitter, and had one of the cleanest user interfaces for depot-based email systems.
Tutanota is a depot-based system where every user is issued a standard email address ending in "@tutanota.com". Users can send and receive email from this address as they normally would. During account creation, Tutanota generates a public/private key pair for the user. These keys are stored on Tutanota's servers, with the private key being encrypted with the user's Tutanota account password. When Tutanota users send messages to other Tutanota users, the messages are automatically encrypted and signed with the appropriate keys. When a Tutanota users sends a message to a non-Tutanota user, they have the option of encrypting it with a shared secret (i.e., password). When the non-Tutanota user receives the encrypted email, they are redirected to Tutanota's webserver, where they can enter the shared secret and decrypt the message. Tutanota's interface also allows the non-Tutanota user to respond to the message, and will encrypt the message using the same shared secret that encrypted the original message.
Hybrid Integrated-Depot-based (Virtru)
As we tested different secure email systems, we discovered Virtru 4 , a system that is a hybrid of integrated and depotbased secure email. Once the Virtru browser plugin is installed, Virtru functions much the same as Pwm, including automatic key management and integration with Gmail. If a Virtru user sends an email to a non-Virtru user, the sender still does so through Gmail, but the recipient will receive an email informing them that they need to log into Virtru's website to view their message. At this point the participant's experience is similar to how Tutanota handles new users, except that instead of providing a password, non-Virtru users are asked to prove that they own their email address.
Virtru is an interesting hybrid of both integrated and depotbased functionality, so it was included as the representative system for this approach to secure email.
METHODOLOGY
We conducted an IRB-approved user study wherein pairs of participants used secure email to communicate sensitive information to each other. This section gives an overview of the study and describes the scenario, tasks, study questionnaire, and post-study interview. In addition we discuss how the study was developed and its limitations.
Study Setup
The study ran for two weeks, beginning Tuesday, September 8, 2015 and ending Friday, September 18, 2015. In total, 25 pairs of participants (50 total participants) completed the study. Participants took between forty and sixty minutes to complete the study and each participant was compensated $15 USD for their participation. Participants were required to be accompanied by a friend, who served as their counterpart for the study. For standardization and requirements of the systems tested in the study, both participants were required to have Gmail accounts.
When participants arrived, they were read a brief introduction detailing the study and their rights as participants. Participants were informed that they would be in in separate rooms during the study and would use email to communicate with each other. 5 Participants were also informed that a study coordinator would be with them at all times, and could answer any questions they might have.
Using a coin flip, one participant was randomly assigned as Participant A (referred to as "Johnny" throughout the paper) and the other as Participant B (referred to as "Jane" throughout the paper). The participants were then led to the appropriate study room to begin the study. Study rooms were set up specifically for this study and provided identical equipment to the participants. For the remainder of the study, all instructions were provided in written form. Participants completed tasks on a virtual machine (VM), which was restored to a common snapshot after each study task, ensuring that the computer started in the same state for all participants and that no participant information was accidentally stored.
During the study, participants were asked to complete a multistage task three times, once for each of the secure email systems being tested: Pwm, Virtru, and Tutanota. The order in which the participants used the systems was randomized. For each system, participants were given fifteen minutes to complete the task after they had completed installation of the secure email system. If they were unable to complete the task in the time limit, the study coordinators helped them move to the next system. In practice, this only occurred a single time.
Demographics
We recruited Gmail users for our study at a local university. Participants were two-thirds female: female (33; 66%), male (17; 34%). Participants skewed young: 18 -24 years old (44; 88%), 25 -34 years old (6; 12%). 5 The study coordinators ensured that the participants knew each other's email addresses.
We distributed posters broadly across campus to avoid biasing our results to any particular major. All participants were university students, 6 with the majority being undergraduate students: undergraduate students (40; 80%), graduate students (10; 20%). Participants were enrolled a variety of majors, including both technical and non-technical majors. No major was represented by more than four participants, with the vast majority only having one or two participants.
Scenario Design
During the study, participants were asked to role-play a scenario regarding completing taxes. Each participant was shown the following text, respectively.
• Johnny. Your friend graduated in accounting and you have asked their help in preparing your taxes. They told you that they needed you to email them your last year's tax PIN and your social security number. Since this information is sensitive, you want to protect (encrypt) this information when you send it over email.
• Jane. You graduated in accounting and have agreed to help a friend prepare their taxes. You have asked them to email you their last year's tax PIN and their social security number.
Participants were provided with the information they would send (e.g., SSN, PIN), but were told to treat this information as they would their own sensitive information.
Task Design
Based on the scenario, participants were asked to complete a three-stage task.
1. Johnny would encrypt and send their SSN and last year's tax PIN to Jane.
2. Jane would reply to this sensitive information with a confirmation code and this year's tax PIN. This information would also be encrypted.
3. Johnny would reply and let Jane know he had received the confirmation code and last year's tax PIN.
The instructions guiding the participants through the three stages are as follows:
• Johnny. In this task, you'll be using {Pwm, Virtru, or Mailvelope}. The system can be found at the following website: {Appropriate Website}. Please encrypt and send the following information to your friend using {Pwm, Vitru, or Mailvelope}: SSN: {Generated SSN}. PIN: {Generated PIN}.
Once you have received the confirmation code and PIN from your friend, send an email to your friend letting them know you have received this information. After you have sent this confirmation email, let the study coordinator know you have finished this task.
• Jane -Sheet 1. Please wait for your friend's email with their last year's tax PIN and SSN. Once you have written down your friend's SSN and PIN, let the study coordinator know that you are ready to reply to your friend with their confirmation code and PIN.
• Jane -Sheet 2. You have completed your friend's taxes and need to send them the confirmation code and this year's tax PIN from their tax submission. Since your friend used {Pwm, Virtru, or Tutanota} to send sensitive information to you, please also use {Pwm, Virtru, Tutanota} to send them the confirmation code and PIN. Confirmation Code: {Generated code}. PIN: {Generated PIN}.
Once you have sent the confirmation code and PIN to your friend, wait for them to reply to you and confirm they got the information. Once you have received this confirmation, let the study coordinator know you have finished this task.
The instructions for Johnny and Sheet 1 of the instructions for Jane were given at the start of the task. Sheet 2 for Jane was given once Johnny had received and decrypted the sensitive information sent by Jane in stage 1. Participants completed this task once for each of the three systems being tested. Each time, the instructions provided only included information relevant to the system being tested.
While participants waited for email from each other, they were told that they could browse the Internet, use their phones, or engage in other similar activities. This was done to provide a more natural setting for the participants, as well as to avoid frustration if participants had to wait for an extended period of time while their friends figured out an encrypted email system.
Study coordinators were allowed to answer questions related to the study, but were not allowed to provide instructions on how to use any of the systems being tested. If participants became stuck and asked for help, they were told that they could take whatever steps they normally would to solve a similar problem. Additionally, when asked for help, if the study coordinator believed communication between the two parties could help, study coordinators could remind participants that they were completing this study with their friend and were free to communicate with their friend however they wanted, and that only the sensitive information was required to be transmitted over secure email.
Study Questionnaire
We administered our study using the Qualtrics web-based survey software. Before beginning the survey, participants answered a set of demographic questions. Participants then completed the study task for each of the three secure email systems. The order in which the secure email systems were presented to the participants was randomized.
Immediately upon completing the study task for a given secure email system, participants were asked several questions related to their experience with that system. First, participants completed the ten System Usability Scale questions [4, 5] . Answers to these questions are used to derive each system's SUS score, a single numeric score from 0, the least usable, to 100, the most usable, that provides a rough estimate of the system's overall usability. Recent research has shown that SUS scores are effective for comparing systems across different study populations [14, 15] . Moreover, Tullis and Stetson compared SUS to four other usability metrics (three standard metrics from the usability literature and their own proprietary measure) and determined that SUS gives the most reliable results [20] . After providing a SUS score, participants were asked to describe in their own words what they liked about each system, what they would change, and why they would change it.
After completing the task and questions for all three secure email systems, participants were asked several additional questions. First, they were asked to select which of the encrypted email systems that they had used was their favorite. Participants were also asked to describe why the selected option was their favorite system. Finally, participants were asked to rate the following statements using a five-point Likert-scale (Strongly Disagree -Strongly Agree): "I want to be able to encrypt my email." "I would encrypt email frequently."
Post-study Interview
After the completion of the survey, participants were interviewed by their respective study coordinators. In this interview, the study coordinator asked participants about their general impressions of the study and the secure email systems they had used. Furthermore, during the study the study coordinators were instructed to note when the participants struggled or had other interesting events happen, and during this post-study interview the study coordinators reviewed and further explored these events with participants.
After the participants completed their individual post-study interviews, they were brought together for a final post study interview. First, participants were once again asked which system was their favorite and why. This questions was intended to observe how participants preferences might change when they could discuss their favorite system with each other. Second, participants were asked to describe their ideal secure email system. While participants are not system designers, our experience has shown that when asked to design ideal systems, participants often reveal preferences that otherwise remain unspoken.
Finally, participants were asked to share their opinions related to doing a study with a friend. They were informed that it was the first time our research group had conducted such a study. This question was designed to learn possible benefits and limitations of conducting two-person studies for secure email.
Survey Development
After developing the study, we conducted a pilot study with three pairs of participants (six participants total). The lessons learned during the pilot study motivated two minor changes to the study.
First, the pilot study also examined Mailvelope, a PGP-based secure email system. In the pilot study, participants with prior secure email experience took between fifteen and thirty minutes to complete the Mailvelope task. This led us to realize that testing Mailvelope would often require exceeding the amount of time allocated to each pair of participants (one hour). Additionally, our lessons learned during the pilot study made it clear that many users would fail to complete the task at all. For these reasons, it was clear that Mailvelope was not compatible with our study setup, and we plan to conduct a separate study of it.
Second, in the pilot study, participants were shown all instructions within the Qualtrics survey. After the pilot, we printed out the task instructions and gave these to users so that participants would not need to flip between the Qualtrics survey and the VM if they wanted to recheck the directions.
Limitations
During the study, the randomization software included with Qualtrics' survey software appears to have malfunctioned.
Virtru was the first system tested in two-thirds (68%, n=17) of the studies. Other than this abnormality, randomization seemed to be working as expected. We examined all of our qualitative data, and after adjusting for this abnormality found no statistically significant difference, and only one observerable difference, which we note in the results section.
While our studies included students with a diverse set of majors and technical expertise, it would be beneficial for future studies to verify our results using non-student populations. Gmail users may also not be representative of the general population's preferences regarding secure email; further studies should be conducted with users of other email systems.
Our study is short-term and is not necessarily representative of how participants would use secure email over a longer period of time. While our goal was to see how well first-time users could work with a friend to setup secure email, it would also be interesting to see how participant's opinions changed over a longer period of time.
Our study is a lab study and has limitations common to all studies run in a trusted environment [12, 18] . While there are indications that some participants treated the provided sensitive information as they would their own (e.g., refusing to email a password over email), there is still no guarantee that participants' reactions mimic their real life behaviors. Additionally, our studies did not test participants' ability to resist attacks.
RESULTS
In this section, we report the quantitative results from our user study. First, we report on the usability scores for each system. Next, we give the time taken to complete the task for each system as well as the number of mistakes encountered while using each system. Finally, we report which system participants indicated was their favorite.
System Usability Scale
We evaluated each system using the System Usability Scale (SUS). A breakdown of the SUS score for each system and type of participant (i.e., Participant A (Johnny), Participant B (Jane), or both) is given in When evaluating whether a participant's role as Johnny or Jane affected the SUS score, we find a statistically significant difference for Pwm (two-tailed student t-test, equal variance -p = 0.05). For the other two systems, the differences in SUS scores were slight and were not statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test, equal variance -Virtru -p = 0.67, Tutanota -p = 0.30).
To give greater context to the meaning of each system's SUS score, we leverage the work of several researchers. Bangor et al. [3] analyzed 2,324 SUS surveys, and derived a set of acceptability ranges that describe whether a system with a given score is acceptable to users in terms of usability. Bangor et al. also associated specific SUS scores with adjective descriptions of the system's usability. Using this data, we generated ranges for these adjective ratings, such that a score is correlated with the adjective it is closest to in terms of standard deviations. Sauro et al. [16] also analyzed SUS scores from Bangor et al. [2] , Tullis et al. [20] , and their own data. They calculate the percentile values for SUS scores and assign letter grades based on percentile ranges. The above contextual clues are presented in Figure 1 .
Pwm and Virtru's SUS scores of 72.7 and 72.3, respectively, are rated as having "Good" usability. Both systems fall right at the 65 th percentile and on the line between a "B" and "C" grade. The difference between these two systems is not statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test, matched pairs -p = 0.86).
Tutanota's score of 52.2 is rated as having "OK" usability. It falls just about the 15 th percentile and just about the base of the "D" grade. The difference between Tutanota and the other systems (i.e., Pwm and Virtru) is statistically significant (twotailed student t-test, matched pairs -p < 0.001)
We conclude the discussion of SUS by noting several interesting points in this data. First, Pwm is the only system to receive a perfect 100 SUS score, doing so once for Johnny and once for Jane. Second, both Pwm's and Virtru's SUS scores are skewed by low outliers. This is different than previous distributions of SUS scores for Pwm [14] , though it is unclear whether this difference is due to negative experience related to using these systems with a friend as compared to a study coordinator, or whether it is due to differences in the study populations. 2. Timing for this stage started when Jane opened the encrypted email sent in the last stage. Timing ended after Jane had successfully sent an encrypted email with the confirmation code and this year's tax PIN. This stage included the time Jane spent determining how to decrypt the initial message. In the case of Tutanota, this included obtaining the shared secret from Johnny.
Timings were calculated using the recorded video. There were two sessions with abnormalities in the recording. First, the Virtru portion of a Jane session had become corrupted. Second, an entire Jane session was also corrupted. This second session was of special note because this participant failed to successfully complete Stage 2 using Tutanota. The remaining times are reported in Table 2 and graphically shown in Figure 2 .
In line with the SUS scores, both Pwm and Virtru have completions times that are roughly the same, with any differences failing to be statistically significant (two-taileded student t-test, matched pairs -Stage 1 -p = 0.58, Stage 2 -p = 0.73, Total -p = 0.58). 7 Tutanota took roughly one minute longer to complete Stage 1 and almost three minutes longer to complete Stage 2. The differences between Tutanota and Pwm/Virtru, in Stage 1, Stage 2, and combined times are all statistically significant (two-taileded student ttest, matched pairs -Each case -p < 0.002)
Mistakes
We defined mistakes to be any situation in which sensitive information was sent over the clear or that the encrypted information was sent along with the key to decrypt the sensitive information (i.e., the Tutanota shared secret was sent as plaintext in email). Using Pwm, no participants sent their sensitive data in the clear. With Virtru, only a single participant sent their information in the clear. In this case, the participant had entered the sensitive information into an unencrypted greeting field that Virtru allows participants to include with an encrypted email.
In contrast, participants were much more likely to make mistakes with Tutanota. Two-thirds of the participant pairs (68%, n=17) communicated the Tutanota shared secret over clear text in email. Additionally, half of the participant pairs (48%, n=12) selected shared secrets that had low entropy and could be quickly guessed by a password cracking system. While Tutanota clearly performed worse than Pwm and Virtru, care should be taken in analyzing this result. In the post-study interview several participants indicated that while they had transmitted their password over email in the study, they stated that in the real world they would be more likely to send the data over a different channel.
Favorite System
At the end of the study, participants were asked which of the three systems was their favorite. Their responses are sum- 7 After adjusting the data for the higher number of instances in which Virtru was the first system tested, we find that on average Johnny's task completion time drops by 15 seconds for Virtru and increases by 10 seconds for Pwm. These differences are not statistically significant from the non-adjusted data, and the difference between Virtru and Pwm in the adjusted data is not statistically significant. Table 3 . Pwm is most frequently rated as the best system, with Virtru also performing well based on this metric. Tutanota was rarely selected as the best system, and one participant indicated that they disliked all of the systems. These results roughly correlate with the SUS score of each system.
Interestingly, we do see a difference in the choice of best system based on what role the participant played. While Pwm and Virtru are rated as the favorite system about equally by Johnny, Jane most often selected Pwm as her favorite system. Based on participant responses, this disparity is due to the fact that unlike Johnny, Jane had to leave Gmail to interact with Virtru messages, a process that was frequently described negatively (both in this case, and in the case of Tutanota).
Similarly, Tutanota was more highly rated by Jane than Johnny. Participant responses reveal that this is likely due to the fact that Jane did not have to go through the Tutanota account setup (which required a long, complex password) and selection of a shared secret for the email (which caused nearly all participants to struggle).
The fact that participants rated different systems as their favorite based on which role they played provides evidence that two-person studies are able to reveal differences in experience and preference that are not available in the one-person studies that simulate one side of the interaction.
DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss themes that we noticed across the studies, especially the qualitative feedback provided by participants on the study survey and in the post-study interview. Participants have all been assigned a unique identifier R [A,B]. The final letter refers to which role the participant played during the study, and participants with the same number were paired with each other (e.g., R1A and R1B were Johnny and Jane, respectively, in the same study session).
Two Person Studies
During the study we noticed several clear benefits provided by conducting an email study where two participants, who already knew each other, communicated using secure email.
First, by having participants play different roles, we were able to study more aspects of each system. For example, in Tutanota, messages need to have a shared secret to be encrypted. Johnny's experiences revealed the difficulty in discovering that a password is required and needs to be communicated to the recipient, Jane. Similarly, Jane's experience showed the aversion participants felt to leaving their current email system to view a sensitive message. While these same experiences might have been elicited by running two different studies, it was convenient to obtain them in a single study, and it was helpful to be able to correlate the experiences of participant pairs. Furthermore, showing that a participant can successfully use a new secure email system when inducted by another novice user is stronger than only showing that a new user can be inducted by an expert.
Second, this study design led to more natural behaviors by participants. In the past our research group has conducted studies where the participant communicates with a study coordinator and we have noticed that participants expect the study coordinator to immediately respond to their message and will become agitated if the coordinator takes more than ten or fifteen seconds to reply to their emails. In contrast, participants in this study were content to wait to receive their email and were far more understanding of their friends taking time to respond. This is at least partly due to the fact that many participants felt more natural interacting with a friend then a study coordinator. For example, participants R24B and R25A stated, respectively, "...I was more at ease probably than I would've been if it was someone random on the other end, I think I'd have been like, 'Ok rand-.' It would've felt more mechanical, robotic, whereas I know [her] and I was calling my wife, 'Hi wife! What's the password?' It felt a lot more personable for me I think...."
"It was good in that you saw the troubles, like the third system [Tutanota] , I didn't even know how it worked, so I ended up sending an email to myself on Gmail so then I could see what was happening on her end, to know like how it works on the other end. So I think it's good to have two people on each end that don't know what's going on, because if it weren't I'd assume the person on the other side had done it before; they don't-they'll know what to do."
Furthermore, participants indicated that because the study was conducted with their friend, and not a study coordinator, they were more likely to realize that it was the system being studied and not the participant. For example, participants R11B and R14B indicated, respectively, "I thought it was good, I dunno, might've taken the pressure off too, where it's like, 'Okay, he's figuring this out too', so I can just, y'know, I don't have to feel as 'underthe-microscope' in the study."
"I felt like neither of us knew what we were doing, but if I knew that someone else knew what was going on, I'd be like 'K, hopefully I'm not doing it wrong,' so it's kind of like, 'K we're on the same page, neither of us know what we're doing.' " Lastly, we were also pleased to note that requiring participants to bring a friend with them resulted in a much lower missed appointment rate than we have seen in the past.
Hidden Details and Trust
Providing further evidence to prior work [6, 14, 8] , participants' experiences demonstrated that when security details were hidden from users, they were less likely to trust the sys-tems. This was most clearly demonstrated when examining Pwm and Virtru. Both systems use email-based identification and authentication [9] to verify the user's identity to a key escrow server (i.e., they send an email to the user with a link to click on to verify their identity). The difference is that while Virtru requires users to manually open this email and click on the link, Pwm performs this task automatically for users. While this difference might seem small, it was a cause of concern for several participants. For example, participants R6B and R10B expressed, respectively, "I liked the way that one [Virtru] and the last one [Tutanota] both had ways to confirm that it was you and no one else could see the information." "(Interviewer: But you didn't think that [Pwm] was secure as [Virtru] ?) [Pwm] said that it was, but I liked how the other ones had additional 'send-you-an-email' verification or a password between you and the other person in the email. Just an added measure to feel like there really is something different. 'Cause Pwm for all I know, like, I'm just taking their word for it. There's not really anything extra that shows that it really is secure."
In contrast, the shared secret used by Tutanota made it clear that only the recipient who had the password would be able to read the message. This made a large number of participants feel that Tutanota was the most secure system, even if usability issues prevented it from being their favorite system. R17B's response demonstrate this principle:
"Like the order of the programs was interesting 'cuz I thought the Virtru one was great like until I saw this [Tutanota], 'Oh, this one [Tutanota] requires a passwordwhy did I think that one [Virtru] was great?' And I wish, it would have required a password because anybody that has your email password can just see [everything] ."
The sentiment regarding passwords was so strong that several participants stated that they wished Pwm and Virtru would also allow them to password encrypt messages. For example, R17B, R10A, and R10B expressed, respectively, "I like that [Pwm] encrypted the info so that Gmail couldn't read it. I think Pwm would be the best one if it required passwords." Still, not all participants were enamored with using a shared password, seeing it as an added memory burden or hassle. As stated by participants R10A, R5A, and R25A, respectively, "I will never remember my crazy password." "I don't know if I loved the password idea, just because if I was sending a secure password over something, then why didn't I just send the information over that anyways?" "How do you send a password safely if your encrypting program requires a password?" Some participants were concerned that it was impossible to verify if any of the systems were truly encrypting their data. This likely stems from two facts: first, that participants are not security experts and lack the means to truly verify the security of a tool; and second, that the tools themselves-once working-never show the user any indication that they are actually receiving encrypted email. While results from Atwater et al. suggest that showing ciphertext does not address this issue [1] , the fact that participants are concerned indicates that this problem needs more research. For example, participants R14A, R16B, and R17B stated, respectively, "It would be kind of cool to see what it would look like as an encrypted message. ...Seems kind of weird. Like 'it's encrypted now, trust us.' " "Put a more obvious explanation on how the site works and where it comes from right in front. I haven't had the chance to browse over the site to understand it, but I would feel more secure if I understand what's going on underneath the encryption website, and why I should put trust in it." "I would like to know exactly how the encryption happens -I understand that it is encrypting it, but how do I know it's completely safe? If I were sending my true tax information, I would want to use software that is very transparent and specific with how it is done. There are too many programs that are not what they seem, and I would not want this to be one of those."
Integrated vs Depot
Participants overwhelmingly preferred secure email to be integrated into their existing email systems and not require a second account (i.e., depot account). This preference was expressed through the low SUS scores of Tutanota and the fact that only four participants rated it as their favorite system. Additionally, participant comments made it clear that they were not interested in using depot-based secure email. For example, participants R10A, R25A, and R16A stated, respectively, "I hate having so many emails, Gmail is enough for me." "No one wants another email system." "It is just not my type. I don't want to set up another account and send a password to my friend."
Several participants felt that Tutanota was more secure than other systems, precisely because it required the creation of an account separate from Gmail. Participants noted that in Pwm and Virtru, access of the user's Gmail account was all that was required to decrypt sensitive email. For example, participants R4B, R22A, R25A, and R25B stated, respectively, "[I like it,] I dunno, just because I leave my email up a lot, someone could just go on to my email and look at it. I don't sign out of my email." "I liked how it was a separate program from my personal email. I also liked how this program was exclusively for encrypted emails. There is no confusion between personal and confidential emails." "R25B: I also liked having a password (whispered: even though he [R25A] didn't). (Interviewer: And you like having a password, why?) I just kinda feel like anybody could go into your email and look at those secure ones if it is inside your email... R25A: Yeah, I think that would probably be the best 'cause yeah, at that point, anyone could-how strong is your Gmail password, you know? If you can get in there, then it defeats these other encryption. So, really, you're just trying to hide your stuff from Google, which, they already know everything, so."
The love of integration and the dislike of leaving their email program to read email is also shown in participant interactions with Virtru. When users have Virtru installed on their machine, they can read and compose messages within Gmail. In contrast, when non-Virtru users receive a Virtru-encrypted message, the message does not prompt recipients to download and install the Virtru plugin, but instead takes them to an external webpage with message depot functionality, bypassing the Gmail integration that participants were so fond of. This prompted the following comment from Participant R13B, "I don't like being taken to another website to send a message in Gmail. I would prefer to just stay in Gmail."
Tutorials
Tutorials were a significant factor in participants' experience. Pwm was rated by participants as having the best tutorials, with a fourth of participants (24%, n=12) bringing up tutorials when asked what they like about Pwm. Participants largely liked the style of the tutorials and their content. For example, participant 8B expressed, "I also really liked the tutorial. It was similar to tutorials Apple or Google/Gmail give you to learn things."
Virtru also has tutorials, but praise for the tutorial was not as common as with Pwm. For example, participants had mixed opinions when it came to the quality of Virtru's instructions. This disparity is particularly evident when comparing Johnny and Jane. 7 Johnny participants explicitly stated that they approved of Virtru's instructions, compared with only 4 Jane participants. When it comes to criticism, however, the situation is reversed: 7 Jane participants explicitly criticized Virtru's instructions as inadequate, with only 3 Johnny participants doing the same. This can perhaps be attributed to the fact that the Virtru plugin walks new users through a tutorial upon installation, but someone who receives a Virtru-encrypted message without the plugin is simply presented with a blue button labeled "Unlock message" without additional instruction beyond what the sender of the email has personally and manually added. This is in contrast to Pwm, which prefaces incoming encrypted email with instructions on what encrypted email is and how the recipient should go about decrypting the message.
Tutanota had no tutorials, and this clearly led to confusion. Nearly all participants failed to noticed that they needed to set a password to encrypt their email, and just as many didn't realize they need to communicate this password to the other participant. Additionally, some participants were unclear that they couldn't just use Tutanota to communicate the password, as was experienced by user R17A: "I'm sure when you [R17B] finally logged on there were a bunch of emails from me that were like 'Let's figure out a password' but obviously those could not have been accessed unless a password had been figured out." Many of these problems could have been alleviated by a simple tutorial.
Reasons to use encrypted email
The majority of participants (72%) agreed with the survey statement, "I want to be able to encrypt my email," although only a much smaller fraction (20%) agreed with the idea that they would "encrypt email frequently." Still, when asked to describe how they would use encrypted email in practice, many participants were unsure. Some participants indicated they didn't need it right now, but could foresee needing it in the future. Others indicated that while they didn't need encrypted email, they knew people for whom it would be useful. The range of opinions are summarized in responses from participants R24A, R2B, R20A, R23B, and R22A, respectively, on how they would use secure email in practice:
"Um, sending information over to my husband. Like, just the other day I needed his social security card number for something and then didn't feel like there was any way I could ask him and if I had known about this, I would have done that." " [T] here are times when I have to send password to my friend then, then it will be useful." "Um... Well, I'm trying to think when I would need to. It would be nice to have it, in case, but, I don't know if there's anyone I would need to send that information to." "Knowing that I could encrypt email I probably could find uses for it, but..." "I've heard of encrypted programs-my dad using them-um, but I didn't think it was like so easy to just put into your email. I think that's actually really cool. Um, I've never really used it before because I didn't know it was so accessible through Gmail so now that I know I can, I will use it more often. (Interviewer: Do you actually plan to use it?) Yeah, I will."
These responses indicate that more research needs to be done to discover under which situation the users would employ secure email.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we conduct the first two-person study of secure email where two novice users are brought into the lab together and asked to exchange secure email between themselves. Based on our experiences, this novel approach had several benefits. First, it allows us to see participants use different systems under different first-use experiences. Second, participants exhibited more natural behaviors, seemed less agitated, reported having "more fun," and indicated that they felt less like they were "under the microscope."
Our study analyzed Pwm, Tutanota, and Virtru. Based on the results of the study we were able to extract observations about secure email in general. First, we found further evidence that hiding the security details can lead to a lack of trust for the secure email system. This gives further credence to the results presented by Ruoti et al. [14] . Second, we find that participants largely reject depot-based secure email systems. Third, participant success in using a system without mistakes is heavily influenced by the presence of well designed tutorials. Lastly, while participants are interested in using secure email, they are often unsure of when or how they would use it in practice.
